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Abstract 22 
Affiliation, control and self-esteem are psychological needs that human beings attempt to 23 
satisfy and protect (Epstein, 2003; Grawe, 2002). From a motivational perspective, 24 
behaviours, attentional and cognitive biases as well as symptoms can have an instrumental 25 
function for need satisfaction and protection (Caspar, 2011). In this opinion paper, we 26 
elaborate the idea that the maintenance of delusions could be a motivated process. This 27 
approach helps to view the maintenance of delusional beliefs as purposeful, yet mostly non-28 
conscious, and not completely adaptive attempt to satisfy and protect psychological needs. 29 
Conclusions for case formulations, therapy planning, and the therapeutic relationship building 30 
are drawn within the framework of cognitive-behavioural therapy for psychosis. In addition, 31 
limitations of the approach and future research avenues are discussed. 32 
Keywords: schizophrenia; motivation; instrumentality; avoidance; delusion; maintenance33 
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Maintaining delusional beliefs as means  34 
for the satisfaction and protection of psychological needs 35 
Schizophrenia is a mental disorder that is accompanied by a severe individual and societal 36 
burden (Nordstroem, Talbot, Bernasconi, Berardo, & Lalonde, 2017; Rössler, Salize, van Os, 37 
& Riecher-Rössler, 2005). Today, there are evidence-based psychological treatments for 38 
individuals with schizophrenia (see Lincoln & Peters, in press; Turner, van der Gaag, 39 
Karyotaki, & Cuijpers, 2014). The development of these treatments has bas been supported 40 
by the considerable progress of basic clinical psychology research in understanding the 41 
underlying mechanisms of formation and maintenance of single psychotic symptoms such as 42 
delusions and the associated distress (e.g, Garety & Freeman, 2013). However, by focusing 43 
on symptoms, lack of skills (e.g., emotion regulation difficulties; O'Driscoll, Laing & Mason, 44 
2014; Westermann & Lincoln, 2011) and pathological mechanisms (e.g., safety behaviours; 45 
Tully, Wells & Morrison, 2017), the approach tends to transport a deficit-oriented view of 46 
schizophrenia and to neglect individual resources (Moritz et al., in press).  47 
A perspective that takes into account both deficit- and resource-oriented aspects of 48 
human experience and behaviour (including symptoms) needs some kind of reference. In 49 
contrast to a normative, third-person reference such as level of social functioning or 50 
involvement in work (e.g., Liberman, Kopelowicz, Ventura, & Gutkind, 2002), we put 51 
forward an individual, first-person reference in this opinion paper: the satisfaction of 52 
psychological needs and their protection from threat and violation (Westermann, Moritz, 53 
Caspar, & Cavelti, 2015). We will outline in what sense the maintenance of delusions could 54 
be a resource (i.e., serving a psychological function) and how this knowledge could inform 55 
both therapy planning and the therapeutic relationship building. Importantly, we do not 56 
formulate a new theory of psychosis or a specific psychotic symptom, but only shed light on 57 
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existing models and findings from a motivational perspective. This new perspective might 58 
help to integrate existing findings and stimulate novel directions for research.  59 
Psychological needs can be specified as “the necessary conditions for psychological 60 
health or well-being” (Deci & Ryan, 2000, p. 229). Epstein (2003) suggested four basic 61 
needs: affiliation, orientation and control, self-esteem, as well as pleasure, which largely 62 
overlap with other concepts of needs (Deci & Ryan, 2000; McClelland, 1987). According to 63 
the motivational perspective of Plan Analysis (Caspar, 2011), individuals with and without 64 
psychopathology satisfy and protect their needs by means of instrumental behaviours. For 65 
example, refusing to take medication might be a means for experiencing oneself as 66 
autonomous or to avoid being patronized. Thus, a problematic behaviour such as non-67 
adherence to medication can serve the need for autonomy and is not necessarily driven by a 68 
deficit in insight into illness - and fighting off insight can also be seen as instrumental (see 69 
Westermann, Cavelti, Heibach, & Caspar, 2015). In Plan Analysis (Caspar, 2011), the 70 
interplay of concrete behaviours and needs can be represented as hierarchical structure of 71 
nested, so-called Plans. Contrary to the word’s use in everyday language, most Plans are not 72 
conscious. Each Plan has a goal or purpose (e.g., “avoid being patronized”) and a means (e.g. 73 
“refuse medication”). The relation between the means and the goal is instrumental: one or 74 
more means serve a goal. In a 2-dimesionallay drawn Plan structure, superordinate Plans 75 
(purpose; e.g., „avoid being patronized“) are displayed above subordinate Plans (means; e.g., 76 
“reject medication”). Solid lines represent the instrumental relation between Plans. 77 
Importantly, a Plan (e.g., „avoid being patronized“) is often not only guiding subordinate 78 
Plans or behaviors, but is also – looking upwards in the instrumental hierarchy – the means 79 
for another, hierarchically higher Plan (e.g., “avoid being controlled”). Graphically 80 
represented a Plan structure emerges, in which needs are on top. They are the motivational 81 
component of the highest Plans. In turn, behaviours are the means and components of the 82 
Running head: DELUSIONAL BELIEFS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS 
- Page 5 - 
lowest Plans. In other words, the Plan structure represents the whole of instrumental 83 
strategies between needs and behaviours (see Figure 1 for a hypothetical example). Approach 84 
Plans serve the generation of appetitive experiences (e.g., being autonomous) and avoidance 85 
Plans serve the prevention of aversive experiences (e.g., being lonely).  86 
A number of empirical studies have investigated Plan structures and their clinical 87 
application in mental disorders such as borderline personality disorder, depression, and 88 
bipolar disorder (Berthoud, Kramer, de Roten, Despland, & Caspar, 2013; Brüdern et al., 89 
2015; Kramer et al., 2011, 2014; Kramer, Berger, & Caspar, 2009). For instance, in a study 90 
with 85 patients with borderline personality disorder, Kramer et al. (2014) reported an 91 
additional reduction of general problems (e.g., social problems) and an increase in the 92 
therapeutic alliance in a condition with a manual-based short variant of the general 93 
psychiatric management treatment amended with motive-oriented therapy relationship 94 
building based on Plan Analysis, compared with general psychiatric management alone. In 95 
contrast, research applying Plan analysis to schizophrenia and related disorders has been 96 
scarce so far. According to the two empirical studies that have investigated the Plan 97 
structures of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (Gantenbein, 2016; Hellener, 1997), two 98 
Plans seem to be characteristic for this patient group: avoidance of dependence and 99 
avoidance of self-esteem violation. Overall, these Plans (see Table 1) correspond to findings 100 
from basic clinical psychology research (e.g., the self-esteem literature; Udachina, Varese, 101 
Oorschot, Myin-Germeys, & Bentall, 2012) and to clinical experiences from the therapeutic 102 
work with patients (e.g., importance of autonomy; Westermann et al., 2015). In contrast, 103 
typical Plans in patients with – for example – borderline personality disorder involve support 104 
seeking and being in control/protecting oneself (Berthoud, Kramer, de Roten, Despland, & 105 
Caspar, 2013). The potential instrumentality of the maintenance of delusions for the 106 
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satisfaction and protection of psychological needs, such as the need for autonomy or the need 107 
for self-esteem, has not been investigated yet.  108 
- Table 1 about here - 109 
Potential instrumental functions of maintaining persecutory delusions 110 
An instrumentality of maintaining paranoid delusions might seem counterintuitive at 111 
the first glance. Wherefore do individuals maintain paranoid beliefs? In the following, we 112 
outline that the maintenance of paranoid beliefs could be instrumental for the protection and 113 
satisfaction of psychological needs.  114 
According to Plan Analysis, a Plan such as “Maintain belief that you are persecuted” 115 
is both a goal for subordinate Plans and a means for superordinate Plans (see Figure 1). 116 
Subordinate means for this Plan are the concrete behaviours, attentional biases, thinking 117 
styles, etc. that serve the purpose of maintaining the delusional belief. For example, the bias 118 
against disconfirmatory evidence (McLean, Mattiske & Balzan, 2007; Moritz & Woodward, 119 
2006) and safety behaviours (Tully, Wells & Morrison, 2017) can be understood as means for 120 
the maintenance of a delusional belief from a motivational perspective. Here, we will focus 121 
on the other direction, on purposes rather than means: what might be the advantage of 122 
maintaining persecutory delusions for superordinate Plans? Potential instrumentalities are 123 
formulated as self-directed imperatives and elaborated in the next paragraphs. 124 
“Have explanations for unusual experiences”. The need for orientation and control 125 
is likely to be violated by unusual experiences such as arousal or anomalous experiences 126 
(e.g., hearing voices). In line with the core assumptions of the cognitive models of psychosis 127 
(Freeman, 2016; Garety et al., 2001) and the model of paranoid thinking as heuristic to avoid 128 
harm (Preti & Cella, 2010), the maintenance of a persecutory belief could be understood as 129 
instrumental for the satisfaction of the need for orientation and control, because the belief 130 
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helps to understand and to attach meaning to otherwise anomalous experiences. 131 
Consequently, directly disputing the belief through cognitive and behavioural techniques (i.e., 132 
cognitive restructuring and reality tests) is expected to be experienced as a threat (conscious 133 
or not) for the need for control in patients with such a Plan, when no other means for 134 
explaining unusual experiences are at hand. To circumvent this problem, in CBT an 135 
individualized cognitive model that explains unusual experiences is established as an 136 
alternative belief system that coexists with the delusional belief in the beginning (Lincoln, 137 
2006). Only afterwards, the disputation of the delusional beliefs might be facilitated, making 138 
sure that the patient has an explanation for his or her experiences during the whole time.  139 
 “Protect and repair self-esteem”. A growing body of research indicates that 140 
maintaining delusional beliefs can act as a means to protect or repair self-esteem violations 141 
(Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001; Lincoln, Stahnke, & Moritz, 142 
2014; Thewissen et al., 2011). Bentall and colleagues (2001) argue that external-personal 143 
attributions for negative events prevent negative self-schemas from being activated. For 144 
example, losing a job or a daily hassle such as a missed bus connection can be attributed to an 145 
external, personal source (blaming others), so that the malevolent persecutors are responsible 146 
for the problems, and not oneself. According to a recent experience sampling study, this 147 
protective function might only be present in individuals with so-called ‘poor-me’ paranoia 148 
who believe that their experienced persecution is unjustified (unlike ‘bad-me’ paranoia where 149 
persecution is experienced as deserved; Trower & Chadwick, 1995) in face of social stressors 150 
(Udachina, Bentall, Varese & Rowse, 2017). In this case therapists could adapt to a Plan like 151 
“Protect and repair self-esteem”, which potentially underlies paranoid thinking, in a motive-152 
oriented way. They could do so for example, by using the term “thinking style” (cognitive 153 
bias) instead of “thinking error”, when gently drawing the patient’s attention to the function 154 
of their paranoid belief for their self-esteem (Westermann et al., 2015). In addition, 155 
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interventions aiming at increasing the self-esteem (e.g., by establishing new means for this 156 
purpose) could be taken into account during therapy planning (Moritz, Berna, Jaeger, 157 
Westermann, & Nagel, 2016).  158 
 “Avoid loss of face”. Patients have often shared or even enthusiastically defended 159 
their paranoid beliefs and experiences against objections from family members, health 160 
professionals, and so on. Acknowledging that the delusional beliefs could be inappropriate is 161 
likely to be a threat to their self-esteem, because a loss of face might lead to experiences of 162 
shame. Consequently, maintaining a delusional belief might serve the goal to avoid loss of 163 
face, even if the individual is no longer convinced of this belief. There is evidence that people 164 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia experience more shame than controls (patients with a 165 
somatic disease; Keen, George, Scragg, Peters, 2017) and that shame mediates the 166 
relationship between (experienced and perceived) stigma and self-reported depression in 167 
people with schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Wood, Byrne, Burke, Enache, Morrison, 168 
2017). In addition, the stigma model of social anxiety in schizophrenia (Birchwood, Trower, 169 
Brunet, Gilbert, Iqbal, & Jackson, 2006) predicts that catastrophic shaming beliefs (e.g., 170 
“They’re going to discover I’m mentally ill”; Birchwood et al., 2006, p. 1035) motivate 171 
safety behaviours (including hiding) and avoidance. Thus, shame and its avoidance seem to 172 
be important in people with psychosis. A Plan such as “Avoid loss of face” is expected to be 173 
crucial in psychological therapy and, if so, should be taken into account by the therapist. For 174 
example, (1) the therapist could simply refrain from the question whether the patient still 175 
holds the belief (as it is not a goal of therapy to make the patient admitting that his or her 176 
belief was delusional), (2) the therapist could use self-disclosure and mention situations in 177 
which he or she had problems to concede a misunderstanding, or (3) – more explicitly –, the 178 
therapist and the patient could discuss the short- and long-term advantages and disadvantages 179 
of maintaining a belief in order to avoid loss of face, and (4) the therapist could conduct role 180 
Running head: DELUSIONAL BELIEFS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS 
- Page 9 - 
plays in which the patient can explore how to respond to questions regarding the former 181 
delusional belief by family members, friends, etc., which guarantee the maintenance of a 182 
positive self-esteem. If however, such a Plan is existent, but not addressed in psychological 183 
therapy, it is expected that the patient will socially withdraw in order to avoid loss of face and 184 
anticipated shame, which can have many adverse “side-effects” on the long run (e.g., 185 
seclusion, job loss). 186 
 “Gain benevolent supporters”. Usually, a persecutory delusion polarizes the social 187 
world into a malevolent and benevolent part. If maintaining a delusional belief serves the 188 
goal to pull benevolent people on one’s side (such as the therapist), the delusional belief 189 
could be understood as a means to mobilize help if feeling threatened. Although there is no 190 
empirical evidence for this as far as we know, clinical experience suggests that it is possible 191 
that therapists are threatened by such patients’ Plans, which are expected to induce a goal 192 
conflict in therapists: On the one hand, when I comply with helping my patient the way he or 193 
she wants (e.g., call the police), I’m benevolent in his or her experience, but I also confirm 194 
his or her delusional beliefs by doing so. On the other hand, when I refuse to help my patient 195 
the way he or she wants (e.g., call the police), I maintain my professional role, but the patient 196 
sees me as yet another malevolent person or even as a collaborator of the persecutors, and 197 
thus, I reinforce his/her maladaptive schemata. By using standard techniques from cognitive 198 
behaviour therapy for psychosis such as validation (Lincoln, 2006) or using motive-oriented 199 
relationship building (Westermann et al., 2015) it might be possible to overcome this 200 
dilemma. 201 
- Figure 1 about here - 202 
Summary. The elaboration of potential instrumental functions of the maintenance of 203 
persecutory beliefs above illustrates that this symptom could be seen as a resource in the 204 
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sense that it is a means for the satisfaction and protection of universal psychological needs. 205 
Importantly, Plan Analysis neither presumes that delusions have a single instrumentality nor 206 
that all individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia have the same Plan structure. In addition, it 207 
is not assumed that the formation of a delusional belief is final for its later instrumentality. In 208 
other words, we do not intend to provide a theory explaining the emergence of psychotic 209 
symptoms like delusions. A persecutory belief can emerge as explanation for unusual 210 
experiences in line with cognitive models (Freeman et al., 2002), and later also develop an 211 
instrumental function for self-esteem or affiliation. However, one would not necessarily 212 
assume that the delusional belief was originally formed in order to serve self-esteem 213 
protection in the first place. 214 
Implications for psychological therapy 215 
Exemplary implications for therapy planning and the therapeutic relationship building have 216 
been outlined in the previous paragraphs (e.g., establishment of novel means for satisfying 217 
self-esteem and affiliation prior to the disputation of delusional beliefs). Importantly, the Plan 218 
Analysis approach is not a set of interventions but a tool for case formulation (Caspar, 2011). 219 
An individual Plan Analysis allows therapists to combine existing approaches such as CBT 220 
for psychosis, motive-oriented therapy relationship building (Westermann et al., 2015), other 221 
CBT interventions (e.g., for social phobia or depression), or even interventions from other 222 
therapeutic approaches in order to meet patients’ idiosyncratic needs. Nevertheless, four 223 
general principles can be deduced from the motivational approach outlined above that could 224 
help clinicians to flexibly adapt to patients’ individual needs. 225 
Firstly, if necessary, establish alternative means for important Plans and needs prior to 226 
the disputation of delusional beliefs (e.g., a personalized cognitive model that explains 227 
psychotic experiences and behaviour).  228 
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Secondly, use the patient’s superordinate, unproblematic Plans as motivational 229 
resources to facilitate therapeutic interventions. For example, help a patient with a high need 230 
for control and orientation to experience the usage of an ABC schema as a means for gaining 231 
control and orientation with regard to his or her thoughts and emotions.  232 
Thirdly, attempt to infer important avoidance Plans in order to prevent unintended 233 
violation of the underlying needs by your therapeutic actions. For example, a 234 
psychoeducation intervention that explains intrapsychic processes would be optimal for a 235 
patient with a high need for orientation and control, but has to be applied more cautiously to a 236 
patient with a high need for autonomy, as he or she might experience the intervention as 237 
disabusing and patronizing and could profit from a more non-directive approach. A thorough 238 
case formulation including a Plan Analysis could help to increase the therapist’s 239 
understanding of the patient’s important avoidance Plans.  240 
At last, use the therapeutic relationship as a vessel for providing corrective 241 
experiences for your patient. For example, when a patient defends his or her boundaries by 242 
rejecting medication after receiving a new prescription without prior shared decision making, 243 
the therapist could highlight and validate the patient’s ability and courage to stand up for 244 
his/her opinion, which is likely to be a corrective experience (e.g., “The therapist respects my 245 
boundaries and even likes that I am able to defend myself”). 246 
Limitations 247 
The motivational, Plan analytic perspective put forward in this paper is informed by empirical 248 
findings from basic research and also by experiences with patients and therapists in 249 
psychological therapy training workshops. However, the underlying assumptions and the 250 
deduced therapeutic implications have not been empirically tested so far. Therefore, the 251 
content of this paper including the principles for practice reflects the opinion of the authors 252 
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but is not (yet) evidence-based. In addition, viewing psychotic symptoms as potentially 253 
adaptive or resource-like is not completely new. For example, Preti and Cella (2010) 254 
highlight that paranoia as heuristic to avoid harm might be adaptive under certain 255 
circumstances. 256 
Future research directions 257 
A motive-oriented cognitive behavioural therapy for people with schizophrenia that includes 258 
idiographic Plan analyses for each patient (for more details see paragraph “Implications for 259 
psychological therapy’” and Westermann et al., 2015) is expected to result in better treatment 260 
outcomes, fewer unwanted side effects of therapy  (e.g., alliance ruptures), and less dropouts 261 
during treatments as well as a better therapeutic relationship, compared to standard cognitive 262 
behaviour therapy for psychosis. This hypothesis can be tested with randomized controlled 263 
trials in the future following an add-on design just like in the study with patients with 264 
borderline personality disorder by Kramer et al. (2013).  265 
In addition, theory development and integration could potentially gain from a 266 
motivational perspective. Paranoia as a result of a self-serving bias (Bentall et al., 2001) and 267 
as an attempt to find meaning and orientation in face of unusual experiences (Freeman, 2016) 268 
are two theoretical assumptions that do not contradict each other, but have both explanatory 269 
and clinical value in the framework proposed in this opinion paper.  270 
Conclusion 271 
In this opinion paper, we used the established Plan Analysis approach to shed a novel, 272 
motivational light on existing theories and findings on persecutory delusions instead of 273 
propagating another theory of persecutory delusions. The motivational perspective of need 274 
satisfaction and violation allows to view symptoms of schizophrenia and related processes as 275 
problems or deficits and resources at the same time. Given future empirical support, this 276 
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perspective could have the potential to improve cognitive behaviour therapy for psychosis 277 
and to enrich the mainly nomothetic approach in psychological schizophrenia research with 278 
an idiographic, person-centred approach. In addition, recovery-oriented cognitive approaches 279 
(e.g., Grant,  Reisweber,  Luther,  Brinen & Beck, 2014) might be extended so that also 280 
symptoms and associated processes are viewed as resources: purposeful yet not completely 281 
adaptive attempts to satisfy and protect psychological needs.  282 
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Table 1 417 
Frequent plans of 16 patients with a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder (Gantenbein, 2016). 418 
Only Plans with a frequency above 80% are displayed (interrater reliability: Cohen’s 419 
kappa=0.87; overall number of Plans: 77). Plan captions translated from German by the first 420 
author.  421 
Plan Frequency (%) 
Avoid dependence/heteronomy  16 (100%) 
Avoid violation of self-esteem  16 (100%) 
Achieve something/be successful  15 (94%) 
Avoid being not acknowledged  15 (94%) 
Avoid feelings and thoughts that reduce self-esteem 15 (94%) 
Increase your self-esteem  15 (94%)  
Avoid being attacked/criticised  14 (88%) 
Avoid being lonely/being left alone 14 (88%) 
Be independent/decide for yourself  14 (88%) 
Keep control over situations  14 (88%) 
Receive recognition  14 (88%) 
 422 
Running head: DELUSIONAL BELIEFS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS 




Figure 1. Hypothetic Plan structure of an individual with persecutory delusions. The Plan 426 
structure is a fragment and not as differentiated as in clinical practice. Ellipses (i.e, “…”) 427 
represent Plans that were omitted for greater overall clarity. A Plan consists of a purpose (e.g., 428 
“avoid being patronized”) and one or more means (e.g., “refuses taking medication”). This 429 
means-end relation is represented by a line that connects the means of a Plan (below) to its 430 
purpose (above) in a Plan structure. Importantly, the purpose of a Plan (e.g., “avoid being 431 
patronized”) can serve as means for another superordinate Plan (e.g., “avoid loss of 432 
control”). The means at the lowest level in a Plan structure are concrete behaviours, whereas 433 
the purposes at the highest level are similar to psychological needs. 434 
